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Following the battlefield death of her youngest son in 1914, Prussian-bom artist Kiithe Kollwitz's 
lifelong passion for social justice became focused in a struggle against war. The loss of a child and the 
mother's attempt to protect her children grew to be central themes of her work. In later works she often 
depicted death as a friend, as in this 1921 woodcut, "Death with Woman." 
Rosenwald Collection, National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C. 
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Psychologies and the Formation of Culture
 
Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore 
I N THE LATE SIXTIES and early seventies the name of Elisabeth Kubler-Ross gained prominence in what 
many have called the "death and dying movement:' Her 
five stages-denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and 
eptance-became the "dominant, exemplary para­
for understanding dying-one without significant 
• al either in the health sciences or the general culture;' 
ording to medical ethicist Larry Churchill (1979:24). 
ople talked about these stages when trying to under­
d many different experiences of loss and grief, from 
tball injuries to miscarriage. Nurses listened to her 
pes as part of in-service training; chaplains and pas­
rs recommended her insights rather than those of 
'pture or theology; laypeople began to know her 
es without even reading her books. Her ideas about 
what it means to live and die seemed to fill the vacuum 
that had come to surround life's final moments. They 
oriented public estimation of "right" and "wrong" in the 
dying process. 
Kubler-Ross's appeal rested partly on the real failure 
of traditional approaches to deal with the acute prob­
lems that dying and grieving people face. She con­
fronted the realities of denial and depersonalization that 
had kept the hospital doors of terminal patients closed. 
With genuine caring, she soothed the troubled spirits of 
those facing death. As she claimed so many times, peo­
ple need to talk. And indeed they did. They talked 
about their fears of doctors, their resistance to being in 
hospitals, the problems of families and others unable to 
respect the needs of the dying. For this serious recon­
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Each of these psychologies embraces a distinct, albeit implicit, theory of 
obligation, as well as an orientation to life that at times functions religiously. 
sideration of life's ending, we owe Kubler-Ross and 
those who followed her our appreciation. 
Yet gratitude should not prevent our examining the 
moral presuppositions of Kubler-Ross's observations. 
We have reached what theologian and medical ethicist 
William F. May calls .a "second phase" in our modern 
understanding of dying. We have gained a certain meas­
ure of self-consciousness about the problem; now we 
need to attend carefully to the norms and ideals that in­
form the diagnosis (May 1973:108). If the work of vari­
ous psychiatrists and psychologists has permeated parts 
of the general culture, we need to understand what 
operating images they promote and on what grounds. If 
their diagnoses are coming to replace the answers of 
philosophy and religion, we need to recognize that they 
have moved beyond the narrow, limited definition of 
psychology as an empirical, descriptive science of 
human behavior. If they are in fact promoting hidden 
quasi-religious and moral assumptions, we need to ask 
how adequate these are. 
Using the tools of practical theology and moral phi­
losophy to draw some crucial distinctions, I would like 
to consider these issues as they relate to two different 
psychologies of death: the work of Kubler-Ross and her 
circle, and the reflections of psychologist Erik Erikson 
and psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton. Each of these psy­
chologies embraces a distinct, albeit implicit, theory of 
obligation, as well as an orientation to life that at times 
functions religiously. In probing the assumptions and 
ramifications of these psychologies, we will gain a 
sharper awareness of distinctions among psychological, 
ethical, and religious language.1 We will be better able to 
detect the careless intermingling of psychological de­
scriptions with sometimes questionable prescriptive 
moral judgments and quasi-religious hopes. We will 
recognize when psychological "fact" contains biases 
that may not fit alternative convictions and traditions. 
And we will perhaps become more conscious about the 
formation of culture and its effects. 
I should state at the outset that I do not claim in this 
article to have addressed the diverse approaches to 
death among different ethnic subcultures; I suspect that 
we would find religious responses quite different from 
those studied here. My focus is the mainstream, large­
ly white, primarily Protestant culture, which in turn ex­
erts a strong influence upon other communities within 
society. Nor do I consider here the more empirical ques­
tion of the efficacy of these psychologies in working 
with the dying and the grieving. My intent is to analyze 
the assumptions behind the death and dying move­
ment and their influence on the dominant culture. 
Freud as Founding Father: ALesson 
in the Formation of the CuI e 
A survey of the bookstore's stack of self-help and popu­
lar religious literature tells us that d.eath has become 
psychologized. Much of the advice for the terminally ill 
and the grieving comes from particular psychologists, 
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psychiatrists, and, digging slightly deeper, from Freud. 
Sociologist Philip Rieff (1968) argues forcefully that 
Freud and his creation of "psychological man" have 
completely subverted former ways of defining the good 
or virtuous person and community, along with the 
"religious man:' Many in the modern world use psy­
chological jargon more readily than religious language, 
talk more comfortably about unconscious wishes than 
about the hunger of the spirit. 
But not only do we possess new vocabulary, Rieff 
contends, we act differently. We make decisions guided 
by new psychological ideals that have begun to function 
moralistically. Freud participated in a moral revolution 
that some lament (see Robert Bellah's Habits of the Heart 
[1985], for example, or Allan Bloom's Closing of the 
American Mind [1987]). But few have turned their anal­
ysis to the specific question of how we think about 
death. 
In a significant article, "Reflections upon War and 
Death" ([1915] 1963a), and in his hypothesis of a death 
instinct ([1920] 1961a), Freud transformed the topic of 
death into a legitimate subject for scientific inquiry. 
Finitude, once considered an ultimate reality for phi­
losophy and religion to ponder, became the property 
of psychological study. Despite some of his moral 
suggestions and despite his abstruse speculations 
about the death instinct, however, Freud insisted that 
his theories remained purely scientific. He wanted 
to see his psychology of the mind as a hard science 
akin to physics, chemistry, and biology in spite of the 
Austrian neurologist 
and founder of psycho­
analysis Sigmund Freud 
(1856-1939). 
Historical Pictures Service, Chicago 
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Many in the modern world use psychological jargon more readily than 
religious language, talk more comfortably about unconscious wishes 
than about the hunger of the spirit. 
moral and philosophical nature of certain premises. 
But in investigating questions concerning death, 
Freud moves beyond the discipline of empirical psy­
chology as he himself defines it and into the realms of 
philosophy (see Ricoeur 1970:63-64,86, 153-57, 255-59). 
On the one hand he tries to dispel rumors of this flight 
into philosophy. He tries to dispel the idea that his 
theories reveal a troubled reaction to the departure of 
his two sons to the front in World War I, the unexpected 
death of his daughter, and ultimately, his own suffering 
with cancer of the jaw that plagued him for sixteen 
years (Jones 1961:391-92, 402; Hughes 1977:136; Becker 
1973:97-105). Yet at the same time he clearly begins to 
propose philosophical answers to some of life's most 
troubling existential questions. He claims that the aim of 
all life is death. We can explain all life, from the evolu­
tion of civilization to the activity of cellular life, by the 
conflict between these two" 'Heavenly Powers; eternal 
Eros ... [and] his equally immortal adversary... Death" 
([1930] 1961b:69). In so arguing Freud establishes a 
premise about the nature of life that is not unlike reli­
gious formulations. As practical theologian Don S. 
Browning acknowledges, here his "positivism ends in a 
fideism'~a belief that these and only these two forces, 
love and death, "give exhaustive account of the effective 
forces determinative of human destiny" (1984:150). 
And it is the "impartial instrument" of psychoanal­
YSis, not the illusions and delusions of religious hope, 
that must educate us to this reality. In one more arena, 
Freud calls us away from wishful thinking to the harsh­
ness of existence. "If you would endure life, b prepared 
for death .... To endure life remains, when all is said 
the first duty of all living beings" ([1915] 1963a:133): 
Acquiesce to fate and free your energies for finite life. 
Listen with King Lear to the message of "eternal 
wisdom" that bids us to "renounce love, choose death 
and make friends with the necessity of dying" ([1913] 
1963b:78). 
But in making psychology responsible for examin­
ing the meaning of death and for suggesting the duties 
of human response, Freud deviated subtly from his 
original postulation of moral and religious impartiality. 
This transformation illustrates what Browning describes 
as psychology becoming "culture" (1980:20-22; 1987: 
5-6,29-31). Scientific psychology, interested in charting 
material causes and consequences of human actions 
and feelings, seldom abides by this strict definition of its 
boundaries. Psychology, though narrowly conceived, 
becomes a broad enterprise that shapes culture and pro­
jects an ideology based upon its own metaphors, 
models, and norms. This is particularly true when ex­
istential questions of death are the subject of investiga­
tion. Inescapably the death and dying movement enters 
the philosophical and religious debate over life's pur­
pose and meaning. 
Many of Freud's ideas have infiltrated modern at­
titudes, largely through psychiatrists and psychologists, 
yet seldom do these thinkers note their ambiguous debt 
to Freud. The development from Freud's writings on the 
death instinct to the mass production of death literature 
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began slowly with social scientist Eric Lindemann's 
research in 1944 on the symptoms of acute grief ([1944] 
1965:186-201). About a decade later sociologist Geoffrey 
Corer's often quoted "Pornography of Death" ([1954] 
1965) appeared, its themes reminiscent of Freudian 
assumptions. In the following year (1955) psychologist 
Hennan Feifel battled with the American Psychological 
Association over the appropriateness of death as a sub­
ject of psychological study at the annual meeting. He 
forced the discussion of death into academic circles, 
publishing The Meaning of Death, one of the first collec­
tions of essays on the psychology of death, in 1959. 
Other books like Jessica Mitford's American Way of 
Death (1963), Kubler-Ross's On Death and Dying (1969), 
and Ernest Becker's Denial of Death (1973) popularized 
the subject. On one level, these authors intended to ex­
amine the circumstances of dying or the relationship 
between death and neurosis. On another level, how­
.ever, they promoted psychology as a new source of 
!'8Uidance replacing dated religious counsel. Becker's 
book is an excellent example. He asserts that belief in 
e providential and the sacred has collapsed. The "new 
~lief system" of psychology must come to the rescue 
:(Becker 1973:ix-xi, 272-73, 284). 
Yet most scholars continued their allegiance to 
ud's premise of moral and religious neutrality de­
ite the nature of their work. Almost inevitably what 
considered purely investigatory study-the gather­
of data, the testing of hypotheses, the formulation of 
servations on human behavior-grew into recom­
mendations about how individuals and society should 
regard the fact of mortality. In shifting from a focus on 
early childhood experiences to judgments about the 
other end of the life cycle, even Freud's "value-free" 
observations grow into value-loaded visions. A look at 
some psychologies of death reveals several implications 
of this movement from psychological fact to religious 
metaphor. 
Contrasting Psychological 
Models: The Culture of Joy 
and the Culture of Care 
The Kubler-Ross Circle:
 
Death as Personally Fulfilling
 
I group within the Kubler-Ross circle the writings of 
Kubler-Ross hersel.f and selected writings of Avery 
Weisman, Edwin Shneidman, Herman Peifel, Robert 
Kastenbaum, and Ruth Aisenberg. Their work, focus­
ing specifically and solely on death, constitutes a sub­
specialty among less well known theoreticians in psy­
chology. If we recognize the names of these authors at 
all, it is for this singular expertise, and within the sub­
specialty Kubler-Ross is the best known among profes­
sionals and laypersons alike. 
These writers are united in their wholesale en­
dorsement of a particular normative view of death. The 
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as an ordinary fact of nature to be accepted, an occasion for the unfolding 
of innate individual potentialities and growth. 
Psychiatrist Elisabeth 
Kubler-Ross, a pioneer 
in the death and 
dying movement. 
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characteristics of their work place them in what Brown­
ing describes as the "culture of joy:' In this des 'ption 
Browning singles out two beliefs shared by humanistic 
psychologies: that human nature consists of inherent 
"creative potentials which are straining to express them­
selves:' the release of which "brings enormous quan­
tities of spontaneous joy and a deep sense of personal 
fulfillment"; and that provided a warm, accepting en­
vironment free of the "oppressive hand of tradition and 
cultural expectations" these basic potentials will natural­
ly express themselves (1980:195). These psychologies 
consider life, or death in this case, as an ordinary fact of 
nature to be accepted, an occasion for the unfolding of 
innate individual potentialities and growth. 
Several characteristics distinguish the writings of 
the Kubler-Ross circle. For Kubler-Ross, our problems 
with death lie in the institutionalization of modern so­
ciety, never in humanity in its natural state. She longs 
nostalgically for a romanticized past. The impersonal 
forces of technology have caused denial of death; they 
have obscured the self-evident facts of nature. If people 
could put aside the impositions of modernity and 
technological society, they would see death as "an in­
trinsic part of life just as they do not hesitate to mention 
when someone is expecting a baby (Kubler-Ross 1975:x; 
1969:14-15). Others liken death to birth naturalistically 
in an attempt to dispel the so-called modern view of 
death as horrible, destructive, frightening, r tragic. 
Weisman and Kastenbaum state that we should con­
sider death to be as natural "as any other phase of life-
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as natural as childbirth, for example" (1968:2, 42-43). 
Hence we ought not view death as a "dreaded stranger" 
or an "enemy to be conquered" (Kubler-Ross 1975:x). 
Death comes as a "friend" and an avenue to "fulfill­
ment, quiescence, resolution, and even ... personal 
development;' as Weisman says (1972:33). Like "watch­
ing...a falling star;' we await death and the "peaceful 
cessation of the functioning of the body" as a brief mo­
ment in the changing seasons or the cycle of nature 
(Kubler-Ross 1969:276). 
These writers argue that we have drifted away from 
our "traditional moorings" -"conceptual creeds or 
philosophic-religious views with which to transcend 
death;' in Feifers words (1977:4). Weisman states 
adamantly that religious traditions, communities, and 
dogma no longer shape behavior nor should they. The 
individual should avoid at all costs traditional answers 
ihat provide only cheap "moralisms;' "platitudes;' and 
"unsubstantiated generalities which often sound more 
homiletic than scientific" (Weisman 1974:4, 22; Weisman 
.and Worden 1977:55). Decisions have become private 
matters, freed from a context: "The individual is the 
primary unit now. He is free to pursue his own self­
actualization" (Kastenbaum and Aisenberg 1976: 
163-64). 
Psychology therefore must create fresh "strategies" 
to guide individuals. Each psychologist or psychiatrist 
attempts to devise better models or "remedies" to use in 
"coping" with death. They want to make it easier to die; 
they endeavor to make possible, in the words of Peter 
Steinfels, "a surefire progression to a happy ending" 
(1974:3). 
At this juncture the death and dying literature 
"does not simply report"; it "recommends" (Branson 
1975:464). Freud's "talking cure" becomes an ironclad 
obligation: the presumption is that the dying need to 
talk. According to Kastenbaum, communication is 
"probably the most useful single prophylactic measure 
to avoid unnecessary suffering" (1969:51). Internalizing 
emotions makes people sick. Kubler-Ross contends that 
"those patients do best who have been encouraged to 
express their rage, to cry in preparatory grief, and to ex­
press their fears and fantasies to someone who can 
quietly sit and listen" (1969:119). Complicated emotions 
like fear or guilt are viewed as socially determined, un­
necessary, and psychologically manageable when prop­
erlyexpressed. 
These premises about emotional catharsis dictate 
the obligatory role of the care giver (whether nurse, 
relative, or friend) as one who sits and listens. Kubler­
Ross forbids the companions of the dying either to 
judge the feelings expressed or to impose their own 
values or perspective; she places a premium upon an 
accepting, nonjudgmental environment. "We have to 
elicit the patient's needs, hopes, and unfinished busi­
ness, and then we have to find out who is able to gratify 
those needs" (1981:35). 
Beyond eliciting and fulfilling individual needs, 
however, each scholar promotes a similar goal: Each 
individual ought to achieve for herself or himselfa more per-
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Undergirding all the writings of the Kubler-Ross group is an assumption 
that we ought to interpret death's meaning autonomously. Therefore moral 
concerns tend to become matters ofpersonal preference, aesthetic taste, 
or subjective feeling. 
sonally satisfying and "appropriate" death and be helped to do 
so. Thus Kubler-Ross wraps up her overview of the five 
stages by affirming that "if we can accept our patients 
the way they are with denial, anger, bargaining, depres­
sion, they will ... reach a stage of acceptance enabling 
them to die in peace and dignity" (1970:169). The first 
four stages contain negative emotions which can be 
destructive if they are not forsaken in order to reach the 
final stage. 2 "Genuine" acceptance entails a passive 
withdrawal and a peace-filled turning inward, com­
parable to the "primary narcissism" of early infancy in 
which the self experiences itself "as being all." A per­
son's "circle of interest diminishes"; he or she wishes to 
be silent, solitary, sleeping, or "at least not stirred by the 
news and problems of the outside world" (1969:113, 
119-20). Nothing should be asked of the dying; all 
should be given. 
Acceptance is not to be the goal only of the immi­
nently dying. It is something we should "teach our 
children even before they go to school:' If we did so, we 
would teach people to "live a different quality of life 
with different values, [to] enjoy today and not worry too 
much about tomorrow" (Kubler-Ross 1981:48, emphasis 
added). We should all learn an important lesson from 
the dying: "we have only NOW-'so have it fully and 
find what turns you on, because no one can do this for 
you!' " (Kubler-Ross 1975:xxii). 
Others in Kubler-Ross's circle point out her norma­
tive bias toward a five-stage progression to acceptance 
yet fail to make a similar critique of their own work. 
Their criticism implies that they have a better idea of 
how persons should die. Kastenbaum, Shneidman, and 
Weisman contend that the universal application of 
Kubler-Ross's stages ignores individuality; the there­
fore become even more individualistic. Weisman, for in­
stance, argues that instead of a stage theory we s ould 
proceed case by case. All resources for determining a 
"good" death lie within each person: 'We have only our 
own reality... set into a mirror reflecting how life-styles 
might become death-styles. We have our own life to live 
and our own death to die .... We cannot trust estab­
lished authorities" (1977:110-11). Although he hopes to 
differ from Kubler-Ross here, he simply builds upon her 
belief that each of us has the capacity to make of our 
own death what we will and the ability to choose death 
as a moment of final growth or rebirth. Weisman takes 
literally the epistemological position that individuals 
totally create the world in which they live and die. Thus 
an "appropriate death" is one in which we "confront our 
own mortality as if we had created it;' one that "we 
might choose, had we a choice" (1977:119). 
Since a good death can be only what is personally 
suitable and internally desirable, what is suitable for 
one person may not be for another. "What might seem 
appropriate from the outside, might be utterly mean­
ingless to the dying person himself. Conversely, deaths 
that seem unacceptable to an outsider, might be desir­
able from the inner viewpoint of the patient'" (Weisman 
1972:37). In the end, Weisman concludes, "the final 
judge is the patient-whether it feels right to die at that 
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Jr\oment" (1974:151). There are no other possible cri­
teria; there is "no ideal" of a meaningful or valuable way 
to die. Since rules and expectations obstruct individ­
uation, the only acceptable standard is the terminally ill 
person's own preferences. 
Nevertheless, Weisman, Kastenbaum, and Shneid­
JPilI1 have their own implicit ideals of what makes for an 
"'appropriate" or "purposeful" death. "Successful man­
Igement" and "psychiatric intervention" can help peo­
Ie achieve peace and equanimity; the resolution of 
conflicting feelings; the satisfaction of all "remaining 
'shes"; a "highly personal realization of complete­
55"; and perhaps even a "greater self-esteem [at 
ath] than was possible during life" (Weisman and 
stenbaum 1968:35-37; Weisman 1977:118-19). 
Erikson and Lifton: Death as aMeasure 
ofMutuality and Continuity 
Erikson and Robert Jay Lifton put death in a 
'nctly broader context than do Kubler-Ross and her 
Deagues. They entertain ideas about death within 
re extensive psychologies, within "a psychology of 
:' as Lifton says. Death involves a psychological 
ension for Lifton, but he asks us to consider several 
'tional elements like familial patterns of interaction, 
rieal and cultural themes, random happenings. He 
ribes this approach as "formative-symbolic" or 
chohistorical" to emphasize the importance of his­
torical, cultural, and ethical as well as psychobiological 
factors. He relies upon colorful field study-of Japanese 
youth, Vietnam war heros, Nagasaki and Hiroshima­
with an eye toward discerning universal implications. 
Lifton's work has been significantly influenced by 
Erikson's own psychosocial approach. One of Erikson's 
chief contributions is his demonstration of the impor­
tant relation of the ego to society. He integrates a view of 
intrapsychic conflict taken from the psychoanalytic 
model with ideas of the self as existing in mutual rela­
tionship with other selves in society. Even the title of his 
first book, Childhood and Society, and its three inter­
related parts dealing with biology, ego, and society ex­
emplifya transformation of Freud influenced by ego 
psychology and by studies of child play, ethology, 
ecology, and anthropology. He places Freud's concept of 
the death instinct within a canvas of instinctual 
patterns. 
Lifton expands Erikson's tripartite network of biol­
ogy, ego, and society to include, along with cultural 
analysis, an emphasis on "specific historical currents." 
Ultimately he carries Erikson's approach another step: 
he focuses on the human capacity for symbolization 
and its relationship to the ideas of mortality and immor­
tality. Drawing upon this emphasis on symbols, he 
aspires to redefine the central conflict of our era as the 
"impaired capacity to feel and to give inner order to ex­
perience in general" (1976:81). 
From this brief sketch of their general approach, we 




Lifton and Erikson differ from the culture ofjoy in their mutual 
adherence to an alternative interpretation of life which Browning 
names the "culture of care."
 
from those of the Kubler-Ross group, with crucial con­
sequences for their respective views of the moral hori­
zons of death. We may not be familiar with approaches 
like Erikson's, for he considers death within a more 
comprehensive theory of the personality. Lifton, in ad­
dition, both gives prominent place to death and builds 
an entire psychology of life. 
What are the ethical ramifications of relying upon a 
Kubler-Ross or a Lifton, a Weisman or an Erikson? 
Lifton and Erikson differ from the culture of joy in their 
mutual adherence to an alternative interpretation of life 
which Browning names the "culture of care:' They sug­
gest an ethical model based on the priority of care for 
the common good, related to the good of the individual 
but broader than that (Browning 1980:41). They presup­
pose a "generative ethics" centered on concern for the 
wider horizons of family, community, and succeeding 
generations of communities. This ethic retains but 
transforms the self-actualization motif by seeing self­
actualization as an avenue for the fulfillment of each 
person only in integral connection with other persons. 
In further contrast to the Kubler-Ross circle, both 
Erikson and Lifton acknowledge that psychology often 
functions ethically and must be judged on that basis. To 
different extents, they acknowledge that their studies 
invariably lead them from empirical data to comparative 
observations and ultimately to speculation on the 
general principles of universal human nature. Lifton's 
work in particular reflects the return of ethics to greater 
prominence in the social sciences and in public con­
sciousness in the 1970s. The psychological professions 
have in his words" 'outlived' the period of ethical neu­
trality:' They no longer can regard their work as 
"beyond moral scrutiny" (Lifton 1976:152); they do not 
simply "analyze," they "construct" (Lifton 1979:3). 
Hence they must admit their moral commitments­
what he calls their "advocacy'~andremain attentive to 
dialogue with other disciplines. 
In a real way Erikson stood at the forefront of this 
new awareness. Initially, he notes, psychoanalysts had 
no choice but to operate as modern scientists in order to 
free themselves from philosophy and theology. How­
ever, "the causal and quantitative terms" of the founders 
no longer do justice to certain aspects of life (1970:741, 
754). A science that defines "normality" or "reality:' a 
"science so close to questions of health and ethics:' 
must include methods of self-observation and criticism, 
especially when it influences, intentionally or not, the 
processes of history, personality, and culture (1982:103). 
Lifton states more directly than Erikson that he aims 
to "provide a framework for addressing the do ain of 
'ultimate concern''' which depth psycho'logy has 
hitherto "abandoned to the theologians" (1979:35). 
Because he writes about a decade after Erikson, he has 
a good deal more to say in direct response to the death 
and dying movement. In his opinion the Kubler-Ross 
circle lacks appreciation for the psychological and moral 
significance of the human capacity for transcendence 
and the desire for enduring continuity beyond the self. 
Despite an emphasis on individual fulfillment not 
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unlike theirs in some of his earlier books, by the time of 
The Broken Connection published in 1979 he directly iden­
tifies his misgivings about their narrow "stress on in­
dividual self-realization" inherited from the Enlighten­
ment and from Freud. He now wants to position the 
idea of individual potential within a larger network of 
concerns. Theorists such as Shneidman, Weisman, and 
I<astenbaum see humans as literally "existing psycho­
logically only in here-and-now relationships." They 
underestimate "the scope of the temporal imagination" 
and "the anticipatory importance of enduring continu­
itybeyond the self" (Lifton 1979:101-2). 
Erikson is more reluctant, given the era in which he 
wrote, to discuss the domain of "ultimate concern:' 
Nonetheless, albeit in a more limited way, he affirms the 
necessity of generativity when facing "the great Noth­
ingness": "If there is any responsibility in the cycle of 
life it must be that one generation owes to the next that 
strength by which it can come to face ultimate concerns 
in its own way" (1964:133). Shneidman directly and 
Kubler-Ross indirectly refer to his idea of generativity. 
Yet their extrapolations of this concept, although they 
argue in opposite directions, betray their ethical biases 
and miss the point of Erikson's definition. Kubler-Ross 
implies that persons who care about others will ex­
perience greater personal "ease in accepting death:' 
Shneidman argues on the other hand that talking about 
"ego-integrity or generativity" does "not mollify the ter­
ror of death ...even though one can be grateful to Erik 
Erikson for the almost persuasive way in which he has 
Erik H. Erikson (b. 
1902), Gennan-born 
American psychologist 
who conceptualized the 
eight stages of psycho­
social development. 
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An ethic ofpersonal realization falls far short of an ethic of care that recognizes 
the larger web of our relationships to communities and societies. 
made a generative death sound ennobling and nearly 
worthwhile" (1970:66). 
Both these comments obscure Erikson's point. He 
does not propose the ideas of integrity, generativity, and 
wisdom as a means to assuage personal anguish and 
fear in the face of death, although that is a positive and 
desirable side effect. For him, integrity and wisdom 
mean far more. 
First, integrity represents the fruition of seven pre­
vious life cycle crises and their successful resolution. 
That is, adults cannot expect to face death with wisdom 
or integrity without building upon prior developmental 
foundations. Maintaining integrity before death re­
quires some constructive resolution of the childhood 
conflicts of trust and mistrust, autonomy and shame, 
initiative and guilt, the adolescent conflict of identity 
and identity confusion, and the adult conflicts of in­
timacy and isolation, generativity and stagnation. 
Second, the outcome of every age-specific conflict 
between the two polarities is never complete victory of 
the positive and vanquishing of the negative but deli­
cate balance and synthesis of stage-specific "strengths" 
and "weaknesses" in favor of the positive. This syn­
thesis gives rise to what Erikson calls "ego strength" or 
"virtue." Development involves moral choice and pain 
in a universe in which some actions are better than 
others. He recognizes even more poignantly with his 
own aging the mixed quality of every developmental 
resolution. Even the healthy person faces a remorse and 
disquiet triggered by the "increasing state of being 
finished, confused, helpless" in growing old (1982:61; 
1964:134). Integrity and generativity do not eliminate 
despair, but they integrate it within the tensions of liv­
ing and dying. 
Third, successful resolution of the conflict of integ­
rity and despair in life's last stage (as with every conflict) 
can only occur through interactions between different 
persons in the cycle of generations. In general, facing 
and resolving life crises depends to a great extent not 
only upon intrapsychic resources and mechanisms but 
also upon human interaction with "significant ot ers" 
in the self's social environment. 
Finally, an implicit moral principle of generativity 
governs every stage, including the last. For Erikson the 
highest good is the "maintenance of life" or the "regen­
eration of the cycle of generations:' Maintenance and 
regeneration mean explicit care for what one has cre­
ated. On occasion he discusses this in terms of "mutual­
ity:' "an ecology of mutual activation," or even as a 
modern version of the Golden Rule: "Truly worthwhile 
acts enhance a mutuality between the doer and the 
other-mutuality which strengthens the doer even as it 
strengthens the other. ... Understood this way, the 
[Golden] Rule would say that it is best to do to another 
what will strengthen you even as it will strengthen 
him-that is, what will develop his best potentials even 
as it develops your own" (1964:231, 233). By contrast 
Kiibler-Ross's "golden rule" is "to help the on s who 
limp behind in the stages" (1981:47). 
Thus in the integrity of life's final stage two cycles of 
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life, not one, come to completion-"the cycle of one 
generation concluding itself in the next, and the cycle of 
individual life coming to completion" (Erikson 1964: 
132-33). The virtue with which a person meets death 
reaches beyond that person into "the beginnings of 
future generations:' Lack of meaning at one stage of life 
can endanger the vitality of those at other stages. The 
degree of an adult's integrity before death determines 
the infant's developing trust: "healthy children will not 
fear life if their elders have integrity enough not to fear 
death" (Erikson 1963:269). 
Erikson concludes that integrity in the face of death 
appears in that person who has taken care of things and 
people and has adapted to the triumphs and disap­
pointments of life. The person experiences a "comrade­
ship" across barriers of race, time, age, and cultural dif­
ferences, transcending death through a "responsible 
renunciation" which paradoxically rests upon the ability 
to remain engaged in the sequence of generations. The 
person who lives and dies wisely faces dying with 
detached yet active concern "with life itself, in the face of 
death itSelf" (Erikson 1968:140). 
Similarly, the bedrock of Lifton's work is the con­
cept of "evolutionary responsibility:' He offers five 
"modes of immortality" through which we may express 
our need for continuity and our moral obligation to re­
main connected to persons and ideals beyond ourselves 
-from biological propagation, cosmological immersion 
in nature, and creative achievements to spiritual attain­
ment and transcendental experience. He hopes that we 
can move beyond a therapeutically oriented obsession 
with "personal self-exploration" to a "psychohistorical" 
perspective that involves us expansively in "a new rela­
tionship to the world" (Lifton and Olsen 1974:142-43). 
All five modes embody this value. In one way or an­
other, each mode permits the person to perceive the 
"entirety of the larger universe and of one's own being 
within it" and to see one's "experience in relationship to 
the larger rhythms of life and death" (Lifton 1976:144; 
1973:110). People use the modes to situate themselves 
and their particular needs in time and space and yet, 
ultimately, to detach themselves from direct involve­
ment in order to make judgments about and contribu­
tions to events and principles beyond themselves. 
With this undergirding theme, Lifton retrieves modes 
of connectedness that seem to have lost their viability 
for modernity. For example, Freud's thought has tended 
to induce an overconscientiousness about the harmful 
consequences of parental possessiveness or of depend­
ence upon others, whether children, parents, or siblings. 
By contrast Lifton tries to reinvest with meaning the idea 
of biological and social interdependence of family and 
"tribe" as a crucial factor for human survival. Aware of 
the dangers of neurotic dependencies, he advocates a 
balanced relationality that recognizes connections with 
others, both intimates and those distant in time and 
place. He, more than any of the others, points to the 
ways in which the world has become a global village that 
demands our looking beyond ourselves, despite human 
tendencies toward ethnocentrism and self-centeredness. 
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Psychology in aBroader Context 
Psychologys insights have been invaluable in providing 
ways of understanding death and dying. We n ed not, 
however, adopt the various psychologies wholeh arted­
ly or uncritically. Evaluating the role and limits of psy­
chology within a broader context allows us t discern 
options in our moral reflection on death and dying. 
Each of the psychological interpretations of death 
rests on a distinctive moral principle, even if that princi­
ple is unacknowledged. The Kubler-Ross interpretation 
rests on what moral philosopher William Frankena calls 
the principle of ethical egoism. Ethical egoism asserts 
that one ought to act so as to promote one's own welfare 
and advantage (1973:14-16). This does not entail an ego­
tistic or even egoistic or selfish personality theory. Rather 
implicit in their argument is an obligatory promotion of 
the greatest balance of good. over evil for oneself, whether 
the recommended behavior is self-effacing or selfish 
(Frankena 1973:17-18). One makes moral judgments ac­
cording to an assessment of what is to one's own advan­
tage. In a nonhedonistic ethical egoism, the good is de­
fined generally rather than as pleasure; within the 
Kubler-Ross circle the desired good is defined in terms of 
self-realization. Thus, the argument goes, one must learn 
to accept death in order to increase personal fulfillment 
through inner happiness and freedom from conflict and 
guilt. The primary obligation is to live in such a way as to 
secure one's own self-actualization and to develop, right 
up to the moment of death, one's unique potentialities. 
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Undergirding all the writings of the Kubler-Ross 
group is an assumption that we ought to interpret 
death's meaning autonomously. Individuals must de­
cide according to individual conscience. Therefore 
moral concerns tend to become matters of personal 
preference, aesthetic taste, or subjective feeling. Note, 
for example, how Abraham Maslow defines a good 
death: "The right moment for a good ending [is] a 
phenomenological sense of good completion ...entirely 
personal and internal and just a matter of feeling 
pleased with myself, self-respecting, self-loving, self­
dmiring" (1970:16). The implicit ethic operating here 
sembles the ethic articulated by moral philosopher 
avid Norton: the "internal reward that consummates" 
. e is the concluding recognition that "I lived the life 
hich was my own" (1976:190). 
According to this line of thought, individual desires 
d feelings dictate needs, and needs will ultimately 
'ctate rights and moral obligations. After weighing 
ne's feelings, needs, and wants, the right course of ac­
'on is that which comes closest to satisfying all one's 
eeds in the situation. These premises lead to what 
idst Kenneth Vaux labels an "autonomy ethics;' in 
hich all good revolves "around one's own needs and 
ants" and the primary concern is "self-assertion and 
dvocacy of rights" (1984:107). This ethic makes per­
nal happiness, defined as gratifying individual de­
. s to maximize self-realization, synonymous with vir­
e. Any sense of the larger public is reduced to the 
lurality of individual consciences making decisions in 
private contexts based on personal desires. "Public" 
means the sum of private consciences. Authentic public 
debate becomes relatively unnecessary and even in­
trusive to the emotional process of each individual. 
Presupposing the vision of the culture of care, Lif­
ton and Erikson offer an alternative to psychologies that 
envision connection and relationship as a means to the 
further end of autonomous individuality and fulfill­
ment. The humanistic psychologies of the culture of joy 
often consider dependence upon and even sacrifice for 
others a fraudulent escape from the authenticity of 
"creating one's own death"; they identify authentic self­
hood as the separation of self from the influence of the 
social order. In sharp contrast, the motif in the thought 
of Erikson and Lifton is reciprocity between self and 
other, between individual maturation and growth of the 
wider community. 
In terms of moral philosophy Erikson and Lifton 
represent variations on the theme of utilitarianism. In 
this ethic "the ultimate end is the greatest general 
good"; an action is right and obligatory if "conducive to 
at least as great a balance of good over evil in the uni­
verse as a whole as any alternative would be" (Frankena 
1973:15-16). Like those in the train of Kubler-Ross, 
Erikson and Lifton assume the position that one ought 
to act so as to advance certain goods. Erikson and Lifton 
part from them, however, over the question of whose 
good one ought to promote. For them the ultimate end, 
even in approaching one's own death, is the greatest 
general good. The best integration of death into life is 
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Psychology, though narrowly conceived, becomes abroad enterprise 
that shapes culture and projects an ideology based upon its own 
metaphors, models, and norms. 
guided by the "grand-generative" function of mutual 
care and "meaningful interplay" between the cycle of 
generations (Erikson 1982:63). According to Lifton we 
can only transcend the unalterable brokenness of death 
through commitment to our "biological fellows" as well 
as to our common "history, past and future" (1976: 
31-34). 
These observations do not deny other important 
ethical assumptions that operate in much of the discus­
sion led by Kubler-Ross. It has undoubtedly promoted a 
serious concern for obligations and duties to the sick 
and dying, an awareness of the need for honesty, and 
an intensive caring for human welfare. In addition, 
Kubler-Ross raised awareness about the importance of 
telling the truth in patient-physician relationships. In­
deed, a genuine person-oriented quality characterizes 
much of the discussion. Weisman states, "If cure is im­
possible, then care and safe conduct ensure a dignified 
exitus. It is our mutual obligation" (1974:190). Similarly 
Kubler-Ross asserts, "The primary physician does not 
desert the patient. This simply means that we still care 
for him as a human being, when a patient's condition 
cannot gratify the physician's need to cure, to treat, to 
prolong life" (1981:25). 
However, in critical ways these moral considerations 
remain secondary. They are seldom self-consciously ar­
ticulated as such or cohesively integrated into a larger 
philosophy of life. But more important, not only do the 
foundational justifications behind these statements 
move in an entirely different direction, so do the con­
trolling moral objectives and practical outcomes or con­
sequences. The obligation to care remains secondary to 
the premise of individual satisfaction or fulfillment. 
Care is not a duty or a virtue in and of itself, as theo­
logical ethicist Paul Ramsey would contend, nor ought 
we care because of love of a greater good, as Augustine 
and many Roman Catholic theologians maintain. Rather 
we ought to care in order to enable individual patients irz and 
of themselves to develop personal potential and achieve inner 
peace. We care because this will nurture the seed within 
each individual and allow it to grow to its full potential. 
If we care enough to foster proper acceptance, death 
becomes a means to enhanced emotional growth. 
Given these observations, Erikson and Lifton offer 
a more adequate approach than do the Kubler-Ross cir­
cle. Granted, in meeting our end, personal r alization 
has a crucial place. This premise has special merit in a 
society in which many lack a stable sense of self-esteem 
that can weather the threat of life's limits. Indeed one 
critic of Kubler-Ross, George Kuykendall, observes that 
part of the appeal of the death and dying movement lies 
in its very responsiveness to the problems of a nar­
cissistic people who cannot face the threat of their own 
dissolution (1981:46). The movement answers this need 
by suggesting that individuals have the inner capacity to 
eliminate such painful ambiguity and by giving permis­
sion for a healthy narcissism even before death, rather 
than demanding further sacrifice of self. 
This approach nonetheless raises serious questions: 
Do individuals, if listened to reflectively, have the capac-
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ity to master death? Even if they do, is emoting in­
discriminately the most appropriate or adequate means 
to mastery? More fundamentally, how should we define 
or understand mastery, or should we even apply this 
word in discussing attitudes toward death? In many 
ways, personal mastery is not the only nor the most ap­
propriate metaphor. Almost despite its best intentions, 
the Kubler-Ross discussion moves toward an isolation 
of the self. Because Kubler-Ross views each patient as a 
lone individual needing help to work out his or her own 
personal death and because she sees acceptance as 
peaceful withdrawal, her approach "tends to isolate dy­
ing people from others:' The goal becomes "emotional 
self-sufficiency" rather than a renewal of covenantal 
commitments (Kuykendall 1981:47). It may be true, as 
'stentialism impresses upon us, that everyone meets 
death alone, but we are not detached islands awaiting 
urend with no binding connection to others. We exist 
relation to one another and sometimes for one an­
er and not simply for ourselves. Death then has im­
rtant moral implications that extend beyond the im­
ediate self. The Kubler-Ross conversation tends to 
nstrict moral meaning by limiting its reference point 
the individual. 
An ethic of personal realization falls far short of an 
ic of care that recognizes the larger web of our rela­
. nships to communities and societies. A problem 
. es when personal realization becomes the primary 
sole basis for determining action and when connec­
ns between this ideal and other important ideals 
(justice, for example) are not made. Several moral phi­
losophers even question whether ethical egoism as such 
is an "ethical" stance, much less an adequate one. Be­
cause humans are already prone to look out for them­
selves, talk about moral duties must preclude consider­
ing one's own good foremost (Frankena 1973:19-20, 
54-55, 113). Ethics by definition must address the im­
pact of actions upon others. 
Certainly Erikson and Lifton have failed, along with 
Kubler-Ross and her circle, to consider the complex rela­
tionship between the implicit values of their psycholo­
gies as representatives of the culture of care and other 
important ideals. They do not claim to think coherently 
as philosophical ethicists, and we should not expect 
such qualified reflection from them. Still, Erikson's and 
Lifton's psychological theories come closer to leaving 
room for a more comprehensive ethical position. They 
acknowledge that in some measure a good and right 
death requires responsiveness and relatedness in gen­
uine human community. Satisfaction of need is a basic 
component of the culture of care, but when defined in a 
larger context the concept of human need assumes new 
meanings. Individual desires must be understood in 
light of maintaining a mutuality of met needs and a con­




The Scene of Modern Medicine 
The contrast in psychological and developmental un­
derstandings of the person can and should have signifi­
cant implications for how we understand the medical 
context and some of the specific ethical issues that arise 
therein. Not only do Erikson and Lifton recapture cer­
tain moral and religious meanings of death and surpass 
the discussion in comprehensiveness and depth, they 
suggest new paradigms for sorting out the complicated 
choices surrounding illness, dying, and death. Al­
though neither of these scholars intended their psychol­
ogies to be used to resolve medical dilemmas, they can 
teach us about the nature of human decision making. 
They remind us that in our "age of psychic numbing" 
death entails individual and collective responsibility for 
destiny. This ideal has crucial implications for the 
modern medical state. 
The ethical and psychological assumptions of the 
Kubler-Ross discussion operate often, though subtly, in 
contemporary medical decision making. An emphasis 
on meeting all desires of patients characterizes Ameri­
can health care generally, and certainly this has had 
many sources. But the basic tenets of the death and dy­
ing movement, their appeal, and their promotion in 
hospitals, clinics, and homes certainly encouraged the 
triumph of this ideal. The movement demanded that 
chaplain and doctor alike begin to respond to a patient's 
feelings rather than inflict their own. Psychiatrists were 
called in as the newly recognized professional experts 
who could determine and mediate the needs and de­
sires of dying patients. Chaplains were more prone to 
imitate techniques from the social sciences than to draw 
on less esteemed religious resources. In varying ways, 
all this contributed to a tendency in the emerging field 
of medical ethics to reduce all important moral prin­
ciples to an emphasis on the principles of patient 
autonomy and unrestricted rights to "one's own death:' 
Only recently have some begun to question the ade­
quacy of this focus on personal rights and suggest its ap­
propriate relationship to other important moral con­
siderations like responsibility and commitments to 
broader communities of concern. 
Unfortunately, the Kubler-Ross discussion stops 
short with asking whether a particular act diminishes 
personal anxiety and promises individual serenity. 
Although helpful in particular instances, this guiding 
principle cannot serve in complex situations, such as 
deciding whether to provide the maximum artificial 
feeding to patients with rapidly degenerative intestinal 
cancer. What do we do when a patient desires it to calm 
his or her fears of dying or to allow time to "accept" 
death but when the treatment is not always physically 
helpful, when it is often very expensive, when funds 
and availability are limited, or when treating that pa­
tient means not treating several others in dire need? 
Lifton responds with a different focus to what he 
calls "psychological dislocation" or "psychic numbing" 
in hospitals and clinics. He encourages a general re­
newal of symbols for life continuity, for immortality. In 
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place of past images of heaven or judgment which no 
longer illuminate (including some in the death and dy­
ing movement such as peaceful acceptance) and in light 
of future images of nuclear holocaust which desensitize 
and destroy the capacity to create symbols, he suggests 
that we need new ways to conceive death's meaning. 
Nevertheless, his idea of modes of immortality is laced 
with problems. Besides the human tendency always to 
want more and to lust after infinity, there are practical 
problems when the modes are offered as a solution to 
the dying person or to people in general. How, for ex­
ample, can we recommend the mode of biological re­
production in a world plagued by overpopulation and 
its related dilemmas? Or, for that matter, how do we 
recommend this mode of immortality and continuity to 
a twenty-seven-year-old who has been diagnosed with 
cancer of the colon but is childless? Erikson's greater 
concern for care and generativity than for survival and 
immortality provides more discretion in dealing with 
such complex issues. The quest for immortality through 
scientific endeavors and medical achievements can be 
readily perverted into an end in itself, breeding insen­
sitivity to other goods of human relationship and life. 
Obviously, the reassurance that one's self is "immortal" 
through various modes of immortality and that one's 
life survives past one's death does not justify certain ac­
tions and can become dangerous in itself when it means 
total disregard for one's neighbors. 
Nonetheless, both Lifton and Erikson bring more 
adequate ethical assumptions to the complicated 
choices surrounding death and medicine than members 
of the Kubler-Ross discussion. Lifton recognizes the 
dangers of a moral decision-making process that is 
guided by "personal salvation" or by "technical­
scientific transcendence" (1979:376). In a nuclear age, he· 
maintains, we need rather to assume responsibility for 
wider networks of relationships that connect us to one 
another. 
Erikson likewise coaches us to win the game of 
technological progress not through a quest for personal 
glory but through teamwork. When he addresses a 
graduating class of medical students, he does not shy 
away from the ethical complexities of the hospital world 
that they are about to enter. He emphasizes that "every 
technique has to be reconsidered from the point of a 
joint social responsibility" for humanity's physical and 
mental health (1972:32). Wisdom, he holds, will always 
remain a valid term for the appropriate response to 
death and its problems, regardless of changes that have 
occurred or are still to come. Beyond this, medical ad­
vance calls for new rituals that will affirm a continuous 
interplay between those beginning life and those end­
ing it. We need new ways of insuring "some finite sense 
of summary and, possibly, a more active anticipation of 
dying:' Above all, Erikson cautions against any illusory 
"one-way street to never ending progress" (1964:132). 
Rather we must renew our commitments to care for 
what we have already generated. In his words, we need 
a new standard that acknowledges the "responsibility of 
each individual for the potentialities of all generations 
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Beyond eliciting and fulfilling individual needs, however, each scholar in the 
death and dying movement promotes a similar goal: Each individual ought to 
achieve for herself or himself a more personally satisfying and "appropriate" 
death and be helped to do so. 
and of all generations for each individual and this in a prudent acquiescence to fate. Moreover, to understand 
more informed manner than has been possible in past death psychologically does not necessitate an ethical 
systems of ethics" (1964:157). egoist position; other positions are available. 'But it is 
Erikson's analysis reveals the importance of attend­ important to distinguish the psychological hom the 
ing to the implicit moral assumptions and ramifications ethical: these two kinds of statements, language, and 
of the psychological theories that guide our thinking, understanding need to be more carefully identified and 
not just in the area of medical ethics but generally. less freely confused. This has special import in certain 
Given the erosion of many traditional moral and reli­ "psychological" considerations of death which advance 
gious resources for understanding death and the signifi­ definite moral obligations and values with little Or no 
cant transformations in our views through the work of consciousness. Despite minor differences, the members 
social science in recent years, the ability to weigh the of the Kubler-Ross discussion share the moral assump­
pros and cons of various psychologies becomes espe­ tions of the culture of joy. In many ways the culture of 
cially critical. Not only do psychologies of death offer care advocates the evolution of ethical alternatives bet­
limited, controllable findings; they recommend. They ter suited to the complexities of our modern world. 
not only validate facts and observations but formulate Through discernment of the differences between the 
quasi-religious and moral orientations to existence and two cultures, we will find ourselves better prepared to 
nonexistence. face the troubling questions about life's meaning and 
Those who use psychology as a tool for under­ death's place.~ 
standing death can find other options besides Freud's 
NarES 
1. Although I look primarily at predominant ethical frameworks, I am also interested in how religious or quaSi-religious 
language and orienting metaphors influence everyday understandings of moral obligations. By no means do lint nd 
to collapse the moral and religious spheres or maintain that moral thinking depends upon religion; moral thinking 
can and does stand on its own. Yet beliefs, faith, and overarching metaphors playa significant role in informing, shap­
ing, and motivating moral postu~s. Theological ethicists in both Protestant and Roman Catholic traditions (for exam· 
pIe, James M. Gustafson and Richard McCormick, respectively) have expressed similar opinions. 
2.	 According to Kubler-Ross, denial is "usually a temporary defense and will soon be replaced by partial acceptance"; 
relief of anger in the next stage is important primarily because it helps move a person "toward better acceptance of the 
final hours"; and depression is "necessary and beneficial if the patient is to die in a stage of acceptance and peace" 
(1969:40, 54, 88). 
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